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IN-FLIGHT CRIMES, THE TOKYO CONVENTION,
AND FEDERAL JUDICIAL JURISDICTION
By JACOB M. DENAROt
I. INTRODUCTION
A T TOKYO in 1963, a specialized agency of the United Nations
1 drafted a convention directed against offenses committed on board
aircraft. The United States is signatory to that convention; but neither
that sovereign nor a requisite number of States necessary to effectuate the
document have as yet ratified the Tokyo Convention. Whether the Conven-
tion should be ratified is a matter seriously being considered by the United
States Government. The decision is dependent on two vital factors. First,
it depends upon the ability of the Convention to respond to serious de-
ficiencies presently existent in international criminal air law. Second, it
depends upon the capacity of federal law to complement the Convention
in areas which are intrinsically related to the subject matter of that docu-
ment but which are, because of their inherently domestic nature, inappro-
priate areas for a multilateral treaty.
At present, there are several serious inadequacies in international in-
flight crime regulation. One major deficiency presents itself when a person
commits a crime on board an aircraft in international flight, but circum-
stances are such that landing authorities cannot make an arrest, nor even
detain the perpetrator. Another striking deficiency presents itself when a
person commits a crime on board an aircraft in international flight, but
circumstances are such that, even though landing authorities may make an
arrest, prosecution is at best extremely doubtful. It is feasible, moreover,
that if that person is subsequently apprehended in his home country and
indicted, either the country of the victim or that of the aircraft's registry
may impugn the exercise of such authority and claim jurisdiction diplo-
matically. Among those several states, jurisdictional confliction is immi-
nent.
The need for amelioration in international in-flight crime regulation is
illustrated by situations where custody over a penal offender may not be
taken or where it may, but either diplomatic conflict follows or pursu-
ability is impossible. Problems emanate not entirely from deficiencies in
international law but also from shortcomings in the domestic sphere.
Solutions, therefore, must embody a coordination of international and
domestic machinery. It is the purpose of this examination to show that,
tB.A., Suma Cum Laude, St. Bernard Seminary, 1964; J.D,, Union University, Albany Law
School, 1967; LL.M. in International Law, School of Law, University of Miami, 1968; NASA
Fellow at Center of Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1968-69 (Doctoral
Candidate for Ph.D. in International Studies).
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(1) the international rules regarding in-flight crime, as they appear in
the Tokyo Convention, adequately cope with the problems of custody and
conflict and (2) the problem of pursuability to prosecution is remedied
when the Convention's provisions on custody are deemed complemented
by existing federal statutes with their material definitions interpreted in
a more contemporary fashion. In this paper, all those problems afore-
mentioned which may attend an international in-flight crime are examined
and their possible solutions proffered.
II. THE PROBLEM OF CUSTODY
The Tokyo Convention was designed to cope with problems of crime
committed on board an aircraft while in flight. Presently, the perpetrator,
under the aegis of international law, can avoid prosecution under certain
circumstances. This, the Convention attempts to eliminate.
The duties created by the Convention upon a contractee evolve from
its major articles. Its provisions have been reviewed by several writers,'
yet no commentator has synthesized an extrapolation of the precise obli-
gations upon the sovereign parties, nor identified the Convention with
workable nomenclature, nor associated its duties with their pursuability
to prosecution. Accordingly, no valid appraisal can be made unless these
steps are accomplished.
A. Functionality Of The Convention In General
The Tokyo Convention functions when prerequisite circumstances exist.
Accordingly, if a person on board an aircraft registered in a contractee
State,' commits a penal offense' or jeopardizes safety or good order on the
plane4 while that aircraft is in flight, on the high seas, or on non-sovereign
territory,' the Convention becomes operational. Thus, articles concerning
jurisdiction' and skyjacking' become applicable. Also, the chapters gov-
erning the powers of the aircraft commander8 and duties of the land-
ing contractee9 affect conventional police authority." However, this de-
scription is merely an introduction, and is consequently cursory. To pro-
ject into an in-depth study of the Convention's applicability, the first
'Boyle & Pulsifer, The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on
Board Aircraft, 30 J. AIR L. & CoM. 305 (1964); Gutierrez, Should the Tokyo Convention of
1963 Be Ratified?, 31 J. AIm L. & COM. 1 (1965); Mendelsohn, In-Flight Crime: The International
and Domestic Picture Under the Tokyo Convention, 53 VA. L. REV. 509 (1967).
a Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft [hereinafter
cited as Tokyo Convention], art. 1, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 (concluded at Tokyo, Japan,
14 September 1963).
aTokyo Convention, art. 1, para. 1(a), ICAO Doc. No. 8364. The penal law referred to is
actually the penal law of the State in which the aircraft is registered. See p. 178 infra.
4 Tokyo Convention, art, 1, para. 1 (a), ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
'Tokyo Convention, art. 1, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
Tokyo Convention, art. 3 & 4, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
Tokyo Convention, art. 11, ICAO Doc. No. 8364. "Skyjacking" is the popular term for the
unlawful seizure of an aircraft.
' Tokyo Convention, art 5-10, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
'Tokyo Convention, art. 12-15, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
'0 If the Convention is conceived as international legislation, the aircraft commander and the
contractee States may properly be deemed its executive power.
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step must isolate and define the exact activity or activities within which
it operates. This first step looks to the determinant (s) of applicability.
B. The Basic Determinant (s) Of Applicability
The flight of an aircraft registered in a contracting state is the basic
factor generating applicability of the document and is, consequently, the
conditio sine qua non. From the moment when power is applied for
take-off until the landing run ends," the document applies. Other un-
usual factors which rendered the Convention callable are landing on the
high seas, or on non-sovereign territory; yet these exigencies are possible
attendants to any air transit and should be considered as intermediate
elements of flight concomitant to its unusual completion. From practical
consideration, therefore, flight is the basic determinative of applicability.
C. Traditional Species Of Commercial Flight And The Tokyo Convention
From the international perspective, aviation recognizes two species of
commercial flight." One is modified by domestic contacts; the other is
predicated upon some international factor. A domestic flight is one whose
take-off and intermediate stops are executed within the State where the
aircraft is registered and whose final landing is to be made in that same
State.a International flight is one whose take-off and intermediate stops
are executed in a non-registry State or one whose final landing is to be
made in such sovereign.' The Tokyo Convention does not limit its total
applicability to one type of flight to the exclusion of the other. Article 1,
section 2 states that, except as provided in Chapter III, the Convention
applies while any aircraft registered in a contracting State is in flight.
Since flight as defined by the Convention" is not circumscribed to any
particular flight pattern; all provisions of the document not subject to the
exception in Chapter III respond to domestic flight as well as to inter-
national transportation." Thus, it seems that the determinant of applica-
" Tokyo Convention, art. 1, para. 3, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
"ZTokyo Convention, art. 1, para. 4, ICAO Doc. No. 8364, states that "[t]his Convention
does not apply to aircraft used in military, customs, or police service." Thus it does apply to
aircraft used in private service. The most prominent type of private service is commercial air
transit. It is with that type of air activity that this paper is primarily concerned and to which
the Convention practically addresses itself. Mendelsohn, supra note I tenders innumerable examples
involving in-flight crimes, each example itself expressing a commercial flight. D. BILLYOu, AIR LAW
186 (2d ed. 1964) states that "the growth of international air transport has led to increasing con-
cern as to the international aspects of the commission of offenses on board aircraft." When writers
discuss the Tokyo Convention, they invariably relate it to commercial flight.
"' This traditional definition may be gleaned from the terms "interstate air commerce" and
"interstate air transportation" as defined by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101 (2) (a) &
(21) (a), 72 Stat. 737 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964). It is further clarified by the
negative implication of the term "international transportation" as defined by the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air [hereinafter cited as
the Warsaw Convention], art. 1 (2), 29 Oct. 1934, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (concluded at
Warsaw, Poland, 12 Oct. 1929). See also City of Philadelphia v. CAB, 289 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir.
1961).
"4 This definition may be gleaned from the terms "foreign air commerce" and "foreign air
transportation" as defined by Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101 (20) (c) & (21) (c), 72 Stat.
737 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964); and from the term "international transportation"
as defined by the Warsaw Convention, art. 1 (2), 49 Star. 3000, T.S. No. 876. See also Pan Am. Air-
ways, Inc. v. United States, 150 F. Supp. 569 (U.S. Cust. Ct. 1957).
"SSupra note 10.
"6See p. 172 supra.
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bility is quite simple, yet Chapter III radically affects the organic structure
of the document, as it causes different articles of the Convention to become
contingent upon different species of flight defined by the document.
Ultimately dependent on this structure are the particular duties upon a
contractee landing State.
Article 57 states that the chapter on the powers of an aircraft com-
mander shall not apply to offenses and acts committed on board an air-
craft when both the last point of take-off and next point of intended
landing are within in the registry State unless that aircraft, subsequent to
the offense, traverses the sovereign airspace of a non-registry State with
the person still on board.1" The establishment of this exception to the
general provision of Article 1, section 2 creates air movement distinct
from that expressed in Article 1, section 2. The Tokyo Convention, as a
result, admits two species of flight, both posited as different determinants
of applicability for different chapters of the Convention.
D. The Tokyo International Flight
In order to facilitate the examination of the Convention, the terms
"international flight" and "Article 1 air transit" will be used to differ-
entiate the two species."5 The Convention defines an international flight"0 in
the light of several factual patterns. It exists when the last point of take-off
or the next point of intended landing is within a non-registry State,"' when
the air space of a non-registry sovereign is penetrated while the perpetrator
of an offense or act proscribed by the Convention is still on board the aero-
plane," or if the offense or act is committed in non-registry airspace, a upon
the high seas, or upon non-sovereign territories.' By exclusion, and only for
" Tokyo Convention, art. 5, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364. This is the key article in Chapter
III of the Tokyo Convention.
"
5 Tokyo Convention, art. 5, ICAO Doc. No. 8364, states:
1. The provisions of this Chapter [power of aircraft commander] shall not apply to
offences and acts committed or about to be committed by a person on board an air-
craft in flight in the airspace of the State of registration or over the high seas or
any other area outside the territory of any State unless the last point of take-off or
the next point of intended landing is situated in a State other than that of regis-
tration, or the aircraft subsequently flies in the airspace of a State other than that
of registration with such person still on board.
As will be seen, the impact of this article has tremendous effect upon the applicability of the draft.
" The term "international flight" is chosen because it most appropriately characterizes that
type of air movement (flight patterns) which is made condition to the effectualization of the
Tokyo Convention, art. 5, ICAO Doc. No. 8364, i.e., a flight not entirely confined to domestic
(flag) contacts. The term "Article 1 air transit" is substituted for the word flight as used in the
Tokyo Convention, art. 1, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364. It is believed that the substitution elimi-
nates the possibility of confusion that may result from the word flight due to its susceptibility to
many popular interpretations which are not necessarily co-terminous with the idea expressed in art. 1.
"
5 From Tokyo Convention, art. 1, para. 2, and art. 5, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364, it is
obvious that the Tokyo Convention is defining its essential ideas in terms of itself. It does not
incorporate by reference the definitions of international flight or domestic flight as found in other
protocols and conventions.
" Tokyo Convention, art. 5, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
22 Id.
" Tokyo Convention, art. 1, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364. Since art. 5, para. 1, only refers
to offenses or acts committed on board an aircraft in flight in the airspace of the flag State, offenses
or acts committed in non-registry airspace are not subject to the provisions of that article, but are
subject to the provision relating to the general applicability of the Convention.
" Tokyo Convention, art. 1, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364. The offense or act was not per-
formed in registry airspace. Art. 5, para. 1 is not applicable.
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purposes of the Convention, any other flight must be considered non-
international, and hence domestic. Domestic flight exists when the last
point of take-off and the next point of intended landing are within the
registry State," provided that the aircraft, subsequent to the offense or
act, does not penetrate the air space of a non-registry State with the
perpetrator still on board.'6 The domesticity of the flight is not disturbed
by the fact that the aeroplane may have traversed non-registry air space
before the offense was committed;2 7 nor is it affected by the fact that the
aircraft may have flown over the high seas, over non-sovereign territory
during its course," or landed on the high seas or on non-sovereign territory
subsequent to the commission of the act."
E. Article I Air Transit
Article 1 air transit flows from the general determinant of the Conven-
tion's applicability, that of flight." It embraces any type of commercial
air transportation, 1 and accordingly, it refers equally to either interna-
tional or domestic flight as defined by the Convention's articles .It is
flight unmodified and pervasive, notwithstanding that it includes inter-
national flight. Its functional value comes from the domestic side of its
spectrum. Therefore, the salient pattern should be a flag flight unless
otherwise noted.
F. The Effect Of A Domestic Flight
Determination of which provisions of the Convention are operative
depends upon the species of flight involved. The articles on jurisdiction and
unlawful seizure of an aircraft are always applicable in an Article 1 air
transit." Consequently, they function when the flight is domestic and
their language becomes municipal law of the registry State. This conclu-
sion, however, has meagre significance in that when a flight is domestic,
the registry State, under the principle of territoriality, asserts sovereign
authority over acts through its jurisdictional and criminal statutes. The
Convention's chapter on jurisdiction merely reaffirms this sovereignty."
Its chapter on skyjacking creates duties which are but the normal course
2 This is the obvious meaning of Tokyo Convention, art 5, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
"STokyo Convention, art. 5, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
"'Tokyo Convention, art. 5, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364, states that the airplane must tra-
verse non-registry airspace subsequent to the commission of the offense or act if the aircraft com-
mander is to have authority under the Convention for offenses and acts committed in registry
airspace.
2 Tokyo Convention, art. 5, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
29 In such a case, the offense or act was committed in registry airspace. Landing on the high
sea or on non-sovereign territories is not an exception to the general provisions of Tokyo Con-
vention, art. 5, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
"
0 Tokyo Convention, art. 1, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364, states that the Convention applies
while the aircraft is "in flight." That term is not circumscribed by any delimiting adjectives.
'" Tokyo Convention, art. 1, para. 3, ICAO Doc. No. 8364; see p. 172 supra.
12 Tokyo Convention, art 3 & 4, ICAO Doc. No. 8364, regarding jurisdiction, and art. 11, re-
garding skyjacking are not subject to art. 5, para. 1, but are operative through art. 1, para. 2.
"Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. I, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 states:
1. The State of registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction over
offenses and acts committed on board.
1969]
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of action for the registry State in seizures of its aircraft." Aligning these
considerations with the fact that those same chapters are the only features
of the Convention applicable to a domestic flight," the Tokyo Convention
was clearly designed to govern neither the authority that pervades a flag
flight nor the flight itself. This is consonant with the general policy of
international thought: Purely intrastate matters should be left to munici-
pal law.' With the domestic flight excluded, international flight emerges
as the only meaningful determinant of the document's applicability.
Since all sections of the convention are operative in an international
flight, a term within the Article I air transit, the chapters on jurisdiction
and skyjacking are applicable. 7 As the term is the catalyst for the powers
of the aircraft commander,"9 the chapter relevant to that subject is also
applicable. The extension by which the chapter on States' duties is operative
upon international flight will be subsequently discussed.
G. The Convention's Police Powers
International flight as conceived from Article 5 invests the aircraft
commander with international police power, an authority commencing
when all external doors are closed following embarkation and ceasing
when any door is opened for disembarkation.3 It is not disrupted when
there is a forced landing,4 for during that time the commander is the
internal executive authority of the Convention. An international flight
also invests the contractee States with international police power beginning
when there is an unlawful seizure of an aircraft and ending when control
is restored." The chapter concerning skyjacking is operative upon Article
1 air transit as that term embraces international flight. As a result, the
contractee States become the external executive authority of the Conven-
tion when on-board police power has been unlawfully usurped in inter-
national flight.
Before these respective police powers are explored, their specific target-
areas should be clearly circumscribed. The Tokyo draft-convention is
directed against three particular types of activity that may occur on-
board the registered aircraft of a contractee State: it attacks (1) the un-
lawful seizure of an aircraft when perpetrated in Article I air transit;'
(2) any act impairing the safety or good order of the aeroplane when
"Tokyo Convention, art. 11, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364, states that contractee States must
take all appropriate measures to restore control of the aircraft and to permit its passengers and
crew to continue their journey as soon as practicable.
3' It has already been remarked that the articles referring to the powers of the aircraft com-
mander are restricted to international flight. It will be explained infra that the sections regarding
the duties of contractee States, with but one exception, are dependent for their operation upon the
execution of the commander's authority.
'3 U.N. CHARTER art. 21, para. 3, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945)' states:
Nothing herein shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.
"Tokyo Convention, art. 5, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
38 Id.
"Tokyo Convention, art. 5, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.





committed in international flight;43 and, (3) any offense against penal law
when committed in international flight." The Convention pretends to have
application against those latter two activities notwithstanding the type of
flight; ' but as mentioned previously, the Convention has no practical effect
on a domestic flight: as the municipal police power of the flag State is
adequate to cope with any act or violation committed on board the plane.
Also, the Convention at no point attempts to usurp the valid exercise of
sovereign jurisdiction." The most cogent argument, however, that the
Convention only governs acts and offenses in international flight is the
fact that the police powers of the aircraft commander, entirely directed
against those activities, are not executable in a domestic flight.4" Thus,
the Convention cannot apply to an act for which it has no countervailing
provision.
To effectively cope with the three activities proscribed, the Convention
delegates executive authority to the aircraft commander and the several
contractee States. The operativeness of their respective police powers de-
pends upon the activity involved,
When a plane has been skyjacked in Article 1 air transit (emphasis on
its international side), the contractee States are given jurisdiction to take
mandatory measures to restore control of the aircraft." This fact becomes
clear when the conventional duties of those States are considered.
The police power endowed upon the contracting States is uncomplicated,
but not the authority given the aircraft commander. During an inter-
national flight, he possesses three powers.
First, where the commander has reasonable grounds to believe any per-
son on board the aircraft has committed or is about to commit an offense
or act contemplated by the Convention, he may impose upon that person
reasonable measures including restraint." Second, to protect the safety of
the aircraft or of persons or property therein, or to maintain good order
and discipline on board," he is given authority to disembark in any landing
State any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed
or is about to commit an act" which jeopardizes safety or good order on
board the aircraft. 4 His power of disembarkation is predicated solely upon
an act proscribed by the Convention and does not exist when a penal offense
is committed unless that offense is also a safety or disciplinary hazard."
43 Id.
4Tokyo Convention, art. 1, para. 1(b), ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
'Tokyo Convention, art. 1, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 declares the general applicability
of the Convention upon the activity of "flight." See also pp. 173-74 supra.
46 See p. 173 supra.
" Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 3, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 states that "the Convention does
not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national law."
" Tokyo Convention, art. 5, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
"'Tokyo Convention, art. 11, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 states that "Contracting States
shall take all appropriate measures. .. "
"sTokyo Convention, art. 11, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
"Tokyo Convention, art. 6, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
"Tokyo Convention, art. 8, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 referring to art. 6, para. I (a) (b).
3 Tokyo Convention, art. 8, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
54Tokyo Convention, art. 8, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 does not refer to art. 1, para. 1 (b).
"Tokyo Convention, art. 8, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 does not refer to art. 1, para. 1 (a).
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Third, when the commander has reasonable grounds to believe a person
on board the aircraft has committed a serious offense according to the
penal law of the registry State, he is empowered to deliver that person
to the competent authorities of any contractee landing State." His power
of delivery is predicted solely upon a criminal statute of the flag State.
The power does not exist when an act hazardous to safety or good order
is performed unless that act is also a penal offense. As a result, the power
of disembarkation and the power of delivery are separate and distinct, re-
quiring different activities to actuate them.
In regard to the latter two powers, the aircraft commander may im-
pose reasonable measures including restraint to execute them. 7 Also, he
may disembark to any sovereign; but he may only deliver to a contractee
State. Last and most important, his discretion alone determines the execu-
tion."
Three activities on board a registered aircraft in international commer-
cial flight are proscribed: Skyjacking, hazardous acts, and penal offenses
of the flag State. To cope with these activities, the Convention has instituted
an international police power. The mandatory implementation of external
executive authority falls upon the contractee States in skyjacking. The
discretionary exercise of internal executive authority resides in the aircraft
commander. He may disembark for hazardous acts; he may deliver for
penal offenses, both powers being executable through restraint. However,
once the international police system has been implemented by either of
those conventional authorities, the provisions on States' duties become
relevant.
The duties incumbent upon a contractee landing State" are intrinsically
dependent upon the exercise of the international police power provided
for in the Convention.
If an aircraft commander exercises his power to disembark, the con-
tractee landing State has the correlative duty to accept the person dis-
embarked." When an aircraft commander exercises his power to deliver,
the contractee landing State has the correlative duty to accept the person
delivered 1 and to take custody if the circumstances so warrant." And
finally, when any contractee State executes its power to force down a
seized craft, the landing contractee has the duty to take custody of the
skyjacker. 3 Thus, these three obligations are entirely intertwined with
the exercise of the international police power of the Convention. They are
subsequent to it and do not exist apart from it. No duty of acceptance
obtains to a contractee unless the commander first implements his discre-
"
6 Tokyo Convention, art. 9, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
" Tokyo Convention, art. 6, para. 1 (c), ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
" Tokyo Convention, art. 8, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 states "The aircraft commander
may . . . disembark . . . [Emphasis added.]"; Tokyo Convention, art. 9, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No.
8364 states "The aircraft commander may deliver . . . [Emphasis added.]."
" Tokyo Convention, art. 12-15, ICAO Doc. No. 8364. The obligations that devolve upon the
contracting States are only operative when those States are landing sovereigns.
"
0 Tokyo Convention, art. 12, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.




tionary powers, and no duty of custody in cases of seizure devolves upon
a landing State until a contractee implements its conventional executive
power so as to force down the craft into the territory of that landing
sovereign. Even in the situation where the aircraft is voluntarily put down
by the skyjacking, the landing State, as a contractee, must execute its police
power to restore control. The duty of custody in such case, though not
dependent for its existence on that exercise, is a natural concomitant to the
power of restoration.
H. The Custodial Duty
The most important obligations are those which relate to custody. The
duty of custody is imperative upon a landing contractee in two situations,
and then, only if the circumstances so warrant the measure." It is obliga-
tory where a person is accused of unlawfully seizing an aircraft,65 and
where a person is delivered for a violation of the penal law of the flag
State." Yet, the Convention's duty of custody has practicable efficacy
only where a penal offense of the registry State is committed; and then
only, when that offense is committed during international flight. This state-
ment is sound for the following reasons. First, the custodial duty in sky-
jacking has been rendered superfluous to the United States. The unlawful
seizure of an aircraft is a federal crime punishable by death;"7 custody
may be secured through federal statute alone. Thus, it is only when there
is a flag penal offense that that duty responds to a situation not already
attended to by existing legal machinery. Second, the custodial duty either
has no functionality or is otherwise only superfluous when there is inter-
ference to a domestic flight. Where a flag penal offense is committed in
domestic flight, the duty has no functionality; delivery pursuant to the
Convention is a power not executable in a flag flight. Where control of
the aircraft is illegally seized in domestic flight, the duty is superfluous.
Even though authority over skyjacking is operative in Article 1 air transit,
a landing State which is also the flag State of a domestic flight has sufficient
recourse to its own criminal procedure to cope with the situation. Thus,
it is only to an international flight that that duty has practicable effect.
When the conventional duty of custody is considered, therefore, an offense
against flag penal law perpetrated during international flight should be
the background against which that duty is considered.
For the United States and other sovereigns contemplating ratification of
the Tokyo Convention, the value of the custodial duty depends upon its
ability to stop-gap situations where an in-flight offender avoids lawful
restraint upon landing due to a lack of police authority in the landing
sovereign.
If a delict is perpetrated on board an American registered aircraft in





7 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902(i) (1), (2), 72 Star. 784 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1472 (1964).
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to take custody of the offender."8 If the aircraft, on the other hand, is
of foreign registry but the offender or the victim is of American nation-
ality, the United States again receives international approbation to take
custody." The modern law of nations affords jurisdictional basis for such
extra-territorial claims of police power. When these bases are actualized
through statute, custody founded on them does not succumb, by that
fact alone, to habeas corpus." Whether the United States possesses jurisdic-
tion to prosecute is a matter entirely distinct from its authority to re-
strain.
These situations devalue the need for the Tokyo Convention. In their
perspective its custodial duty is seemingly academic; for federal legisla-
tion can accomplish what the treaty intends to proffer. All possibilities,
however, have not been exhausted because when a crime against a foreign
flag State is committed in international flight but is not modified by any
United States contacts except point of landing, there appears to be no
obvious and universally acknowledged principle endorsing federal re-
straint."' Concession is made that Congress, under its power over foreign
commerce,7 3 can nonetheless legislate for such custodial authority. 4 But
it has not as yet done so, the obvious reason being that the United States
could not pursue this custody in and of itself since its judiciary has no
jurisdiction over crimes against foreign law." Notwithstanding this lack of
congressional legislation, federal arrest may still be possible, ' yet this
eventuality presupposes an extradition treaty between the United States
and the particular flag sovereign involved.7 If none exists, detention for
purposes of deportation remains the final possibility for restraint. In that
the crime occurred prior to entry and most probably poses no immigra-
tion violation,7 8 an arrest upon warrant to commence expulsion proceedings
would have no statutory sanction. As a result, the alleged criminal, not
being subject to federal restraint, is at liberty to continue his journey,
thus evading criminal justice.
If the United States ratified the Tokyo Convention the obligation to
restrain any alien who violates the penal law of a foreign flag State during
"8 The principle of the flag State as enunciated by the Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 1, ICAO
Doc. No. 8364: "The State of registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction over
offenses and acts committed on board."
89 Nationality and passive personality principle. Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect
to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 443, 445 (Supp. 1935).
70 An attack on the jurisdiction of the court under whose warrant the petitioner is being held.
71 Jurisdiction to prosecute depends upon whether a federal crime has been committed. That
subject will be treated in section IV infra.
" The place of landing as a jurisdictional basis will be discussed in section IV infra.
7 U.S. CONST. art. 1, 5 8.
7 Congressional legislation, if constitutional, need not conform to international law. Tag v.
Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666-68 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1959).
75 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 59 (1963).
78 It has been held that an extradition treaty is self-executing and that a fugitive may be ar-
rested under the terms of the agreement alone without the aid of legislation. In Re Metzger, 16
U.S. (5 How.) 348 (1847).
"In international proceedings, it must also be remembered that the extradition of a fugitive
will only be granted for offenses enumerated in the treaty. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276
(1933).
7866 Stat. 204 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1964).
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international flight would devolve upon it.7 Such an international duty
is tantamount to police power, and emanating from a treaty, it would
fill a void in the federal law of detention.
At first glance, such power appears illusory. Without an extradition
treaty specifying the crime committed, the perpetrator cannot be extra-
dited, and under present federal deportation law, he cannot be expelled
or prosecuted. The custody provided for is apparently unpursuable were
it not for an additional provision in the Convention complementing the
custodial duty. When a person who is not a national or permanent resi-
dent of the landing contractee is delivered in accordance with the Conven-
tion, that sovereign may return to the State of which he is a national or
permanent resident or to the State in which he began his journey by air."
Thus, the Tokyo Convention in part is a multilateral deportation agree-
ment. Once ratified as a treaty, it augments by nature"5 the federal law on
expulsion. Regardless of an absence of substantial American contacts, a
non-resident alien who commits an offense against the penal law of a
foreign flag State during international flight may be deported. The arrest-
ment power of the Convention becomes pursuable. The discretionary de-
portation power afforded by the Convention names two sovereigns as the
recipients of the deportee. Either may or may not be the flag State.
Prosecution, therefore, is not absolutely assured; rather the possibility that
either recipient may have an extradition treaty with the flag State or that
either may desire to exercise jurisdiction over the offender only serves to
lessen an evasion from prosecution. It is this possibility which constitutes
the value inuring to international aviation through the Convention's duty
of custody and its complementing deportation provisions. Through such
machinery, a non-resident alien who commits an offense against a foreign
flag State during international flight must be restrained upon delivery
and may be subject to prosecution after expulsion. He can neither avoid
restraint for lack of law nor elude possible prosecution through an ab-
sence of pursuability. A definite deficiency in international criminal law
is rectified.
I. The Problem The Convention Does Not Solve
Though the Tokyo Convention adequately copes with a situation in-
volving a non-resident alien, it accomplishes little where a citizen or resi-
dent alien is concerned. The United States, as landing contractee, has the
duty to take custody of those persons also." It cannot, however, deport
them through operation of the Convention." As a result, it is confronted
with three possibilities. One, it must extradite if there exists an appropriate
" The term "alien" is stressed here. Even though a citizen can also be restrained, the federal
government would not necessarily need the Tokyo Convention to do so.
85Tokyo Convention, art. 14, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
" Tokyo Convention, art. 14, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 is self-executing. Deportation procedures
are already provided for by statute.
"
2 The duty of custody in Tokyo Convention, art. 13, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 does not
distinguish between citizen, resident alien, or non-resident alien.
83 Tokyo Convention, art. 14, pars. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 does not confer power on the
handling contractee to deport its own nationals or resident aliens.
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extradition treaty with the flag State; two, it must free the alleged criminal
if the custodial duty is deemed unpursuable;s4 or, three, to avoid such
release, it may look to itself as the proper authority for a prosecution.
This last consideration raises a question most acute to the jurisdiction of
the federal judiciary. Its answer in part depends upon the implicit mean-
ing of the Tokyo Convention. Before that answer can be determined, the
exact meaning of the Tokyo articles respecting jurisdiction must first be
explored;' only against the background of those international rules of
in-flight jurisdiction can federal judicial jurisdiction over in-flight crimes
be adequately discussed, especially when the problem before the federal
judiciary is one replete with international factors.
III. JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT
In evaluating the Tokyo Convention for ratification, the United States
will look for provisions which foster its own attitudes in foreign affairs.
The United States, however, must also look for the benefits that that
document will bestow upon the law of international aviation and crime.
The Convention is essentially concerned with offenses committed on board
an aircraft in flight. A seemingly insoluable international problem attend-
ing those activities is the jurisdictional confliction which arises among sov-
ereign nations peculiarly connected with some aspect of the crime. Depend-
ing on the particular case, each may claim jurisdiction to prosecute under
the auspices of one of several recognized jurisdictional bases. The Conven-
tion impliedly addresses itself to this problem. If it satisfactorily mitigates
or entirely eliminates the possibilty of inter-sovereign controversy, a much
needed concord in the diplomatic field will benefit international criminal
law. The solution of that problem will, by its nature, establish an order
for the exercise of the respective jurisdictions. And as will be seen this
directly bears on the ultimate question concerning federal jurisdiction.
Endorsement of the Convention, therefore, depends in part upon a success-
ful approach to the problem.
A. The International Principles Of Territoriality And Nationality
The perpetration of a crime on board an aircraft in international flight
engenders a select number of jurisdictional questions. It is fundamental
that offenses committed within the territory of a particular State are
amenable to that sovereign's criminal law." The spectrum of territory,
however, is not constricted by landed boundaries; it extends to a traditional
distance seaward from the coastline,' and encompasses the airspace above
4Tokyo Convention, art. 15, para. 1, ICAO Doe. No. 8364 states:
Without prejudice to Article 14, any person who has been . . . delivered . . . and
who desires to continue his journey shall be at liberty as soon as practicable to pro-
ceed to any destination of his choice unless his presence is required by the law of the
State of landing for purpose of extradition or criminal proceedings.
sa Jurisdiction as used in this sentence and in the following section means judicial jurisdiction.
Up to this point, only police power has been discussed.
" Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
" Sovereignty of the Sea, 1965 DEP'T STATE GEOGRAPIic BULL. No. 3.
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the terrestrial and littoral domains." Thus a State, subjacent to an inter-
national air crime, possesses a cogent jurisdictional basis for the prosecu-
tion of a malfactor. If criminal jurisdiction founded on territoriality were
unanimously accepted for the law of aviation, further discussion would be
superfluous. However, this theory, so highly favored by common law
countries, has failed to receive approbation in the civil law system." The
reasons for rejection are many. Continental jurists analogize the legal
status of an aircraft to that of a sea vessel. Under international law, events
on board a ship fall within the jurisdiction of the sovereign to which it
is subject;" consequently, the law of the flag governs. Since the aeroplane
and the ship bear functional resemblance to each other as sole instrumen-
talities of vast international transit and commerce, it is argued that the
same principle of jurisdiction should attach to both. Apart from this
maritime analogy, it is further maintained that jurisdiction by nationality
rather than by territoriality more fairly appraises the air transient of the
law applicable."1 Advocates of the nationality doctrine posit the argument
that the common law theory is by nature incapable of coping with law-
lessness over the High Seas as well as over non-sovereign land masses.8 '
For reasons forceful, and practical, jurisdiction over international air
crimes resides in the sovereign of the aircraft's nationality, i.e., the State
in whose territory the aeroplane is registered.8 Thus, the idea of a uniform
system of criminal aviation jurisdiction confronts opposing attitudes at
the outset. Territorial sovereignty with all its traditional connotations
clashes against extra-territorial authority as embodied in the doctrine of the
law of the flag. Reason dictates that multiple competences play the
catalyst,' resolving jurisdictional conflicts through their acceptable co-
ordination.
History shows several ambitious endeavors to solve the jurisdictional
problems peculiar to aerocrimes. As early as 1910, the eminent French
jurist Fauchille8' submitted to the Institute of International Law 8 draft
articles relating to air offenses. Wtih a rare perspicasity for future exi-
gencies, he proffered a resolution utilizing both common law and civil law
principles. In his opinion, the state of nationality should enjoy concurrent
jursdiction with the subjacent sovereign, the former having primacy un-
less the offense threatened the public safety of the latter. The Comite
Juridique International de l'Aviation (CJIA) also generated its energies
in this field." At first its members subscribed exclusively to Fauchille's
88 Convention on International Civil Aviation [hereinafter cited as Chicago Convention], art. 1,
4 Dec. 1947, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591 (concluded at Chicago, Illinois, 7 Dec. 1944).
88 Gutierrez, supra note 1, at 4-5.
"U.S. v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 150 (1933); Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S. 1, 6 (1886).
81 Gutierrez, supra note 1, at 3.
9 U.S. v. Cordova, 89 F. Supp. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1950). This case was overruled by 18 U.S.C. §
7 (1964).
"Chicago Convention, art. 17, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591.
'
4 J. HONIG, THE LEGAL STATUS OF AIRCRAFT 141 (1956).
" Fauchille, Le Domaine Aerien et le Regime Juridique des Aerostals, 8 REVUE GENERALE OE
DROrr INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1901).
923 ANNUAIRE DE L'INsTITUTE DE DRooT INTERNATIONAL 297 (1910).
'7Projet de Code International de l'Air du Comite Juridique International de l'aviation, De la
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position, though in time, they preferred to modify. The flag State continued
to have jurisdiction, yet precedence was given to the subjacent State, itself
having primary jurisdiction to decide whether it had jurisdiction on the
grounds of public interest." Finally, the CJIA was exposed to a new
theory introduced by Pholien:" The State wherein the aircraft lands on
completion of its flight alone has authority to prosecute the air crime.
This proposition was not readily endorsed. Though such a principle would
facilitate criminal justice through its simplicity of application, it was
argued that the tenuous nexus between the offense and the lex loci
devolentis1" would obtain minimal international acceptance.
The projects of the Institute and the CJIA served only to emphasize
the international need for a Convention. Within those convocations,
jurists had sharply disagreed on the subject of criminal jurisdiction. The
call for world uniformity was imperative. At Montreal in 1950 the Legal
Committee of the International Civil Aviation Organization, a specialized
agency of the United Nations, recommended the commencement of pre-
paratory work for a draft protocol on the legal status of aircraft.' The
proposal culminated in the 1963 Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Cer-
tain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft. However, after that Mon-
treal recommendation, six years passed before any substantial analysis of
the problem came to the fore. In 1956, the United States delegation to
ICAO submitted a detailed paper examining the possible jurisdictional
bases relevant to aviation crimes. °2 This became the major work upon
which further progress relied. The article, after reviewing the merits of
five jurisdictional grounds, concluded that some form of concurrent juris-
diction would be the most effective security for the punishment of crime.
A combination involving the State of registry and the subjacent State was
favored. To insure the proposal's palatability to the common law coun-
tries, it was suggested that sanctions be extended to the doctrine of non
bis in idem to safeguard against international double jeopardy. Warning,
moreover, was given that a system of multiple competences would serve
only to perpetuate the jurisdictional conflicts that presently existed. It
was urged that an order of priorities be affixed to the future draft con-
vention. However, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and numerous other
countries spurned the suggestion.' As a result, the United States in 1958
reconsidered its position, submitting a draft convention avoiding the priori-
ties problem.'°" The subjacent State had primary jurisdiction if the de-
fendant or the victim were its national or if the crime committed was
purposed against its national security. In all other cases, jurisdiction in-
Legislation Applicable et de la Jurisdiction Conpetente en Matiere de Locomotion Aerienne, Chapitre
VI (VI Congres, Rome 1924).
" Niemeyer, Crimes de Delits a bord des Aeronefs, 13 REVUE DE DROIT AERIEN 285 (1929).
" Pholien, Des Crimes et Delits a bord d'Aeronefs en Vol, 13 REVUE DE DROIT AERIEN 289
(1929).120 Rarely used legal term siginfying the law of the place where the airplane lands.
20 1 1CA0 Doc. No. 7035-LC/128 (1950), at 10.
' U.S. DELEGATION TO THE SUBCOMM. OF THE ICAO LEGAL COMM., A STUDY OF THE JURIS-
DICTION AND LAW TO BE APPLIED TO CRIMES ON BOARD AIRCRAFT (April 1956).
" Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 1, at 317.
I° 4Legal Status, ICAO LC/SC No. 33 (Aug. 1958).
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vested the State of registry. France, Spain, and other civil law countries
advocating priorities rejected the proposition."5 Subsequently, a number
of ICAO meetings convened, each debating and modifying its procurer's
resolutions.1 6 By 1962 a final draft convention appeared which was sub-
mitted to the ICAO conference at Tokyo.
B. The Tokyo Convention
The Tokyo Convention circumscribes four areas of international avia-
tion: Jurisdiction, police power of the aircraft commander, duties of the
custodial State, and aero-hijacking. Subsequent discussion is exclusively
concerned with the Convention's disposal of jurisdictional conflicts con-
comitant to air crime.
In international law, a State's jurisdiction to prosecute is founded upon
two traditional ideas. First, there must exist a recognized jurisdictional basis
upon which to rest a jurisdictional claim"" which means that a substantial
nexus between the person or the act and the claiming sovereign must be
present. Secondly, this theoretical basis must be actualized through a sov-
ereign act; 0- this is a condito sine qua non. Legislation is the usual manner
for such an implementation: In the case where an Englishman perpetrates
a crime against a Spaniard on board a French registered aircraft during
flight, it is most probable that the three sovereigns involved possess juris-
diction to prosecute. As a result, jurisdictional conflicts are imminent; for
two or more states can claim the authority of prosecution and press those
claims as against each other through diplomatic channels. It is to eliminate
this confliction that the following interpretation of the Tokyo Convention
is proffered.
The power of a State to tender a jurisdictional claim as against another
sovereign's claim is an attribute flowing from sovereignty.' This power,
consequently, only finds limitation in customary international law or in
treaty provisions.1 It therefore follows that, if nations preclude themselves
through treaty from asserting their otherwise legitimate claims as against
one particular state, international conflict ceases to exist.11'
10"Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 1, at 319.
166Montreal, 1958; Munich, 1959; Rome, 1962; Montreal, 1963.
'"7 Draft Convention n jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra note 69, at 445:
An analysis of modern national codes of penal law and penal procedure . . . dis-
closes five general principles on which a more or less extensive penal jurisdiction is
claimed by states at the present. These five general principles are . . . the territorial
principle . . . the nationality principle . . . the protective principle . . . the uni-
versality principle . . . and . . . the passive personality principle.
Jos In respect to this point, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that there are no
federal common law crimes and that federal prosecution must rest on an Act of Congress defining
the crime. Without such, federal question jurisdiction in criminal proceedings is defeated. U.S. v.
Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 (1892); U.S. v. George, 228 U.S. 14 (1913).
... The Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1 (d), 13 July 1934, 49 Stat. § 3097,
T.S. No. 881 (concluded at Montevideo, 26 Dec. 1933) states: "The State as a person of inter-
national law should possess . . . the capacity to enter into relations with other States." Though
the above passage more precisely refers to the subject of treaties, it embraces any diplomatic dis-
course between States in their international affairs.
11 A State cannot evade obligations incumbent upon it under international law or treaties in
force. Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, [1932] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 44.
... What follows is an analysis of the articles of the Tokyo Convention relevant to the problem
of jurisdictional confliction. Though the major thrust of the discussion is on the Convention's ap-
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Article 3, section 1 of the Tokyo Convention enunciates the Conven-
tion's basic principle for the resolution of conflicts: The State of registra-
tion of the aircraft is declared competent to exercise jurisdiction over
offenses and acts committed on board. The endorsement of that rule guar-
antees to the flights over the High Seas the assured presence of criminal
law. It approbates the extention of extra-territoriality to the sovereign
airspace for other States. However, the implicit allowance for the dis-
cretionary exercise of jurisdiction emasculates the potentiality of the pro-
vision. If no other State prosecutes through lack of national interest, crime
may go unpunished when the flag State, for a reason peculiar to itself,
decides likewise not to indict when it finally obtains physical control over
the criminal. Because the Convention purposed against this result, a decla-
ration of jurisdictional competency, unmodified by mandatory execution,
detracts from its acceptability. The specious arguments tendered to the
prior draft committees by the United States were responsible for its
formulation. A State's power to specify particular acts as crimes is inherent;
however, the American delegate fallaciously concluded that a sovereign
power would be violated by a provision for the mandatory execution of
jurisdiction created by the power."' The fact ignored was that criminal
jurisdiction succeeds the statutory declaration of an act's criminality. Once
it is perceived that sovereignty not only precedes but also creates its own
criminal jurisdictional limits, any argument that mandatory execution
within those limits violates "creative" sovereignty loses force; for, under
the circumstances, impingement is logically impossible.
By failing to adopt obligatory prosecution, Article 3, section 1 simply
becomes a restatement of the principle of extra-territoriality, a rule recog-
nized since the end of World War II. However, section 2 of Article 3
evidences an attempt on the part of the Convention's drafters to compen-
sate for the prior section's impotence. It mandates that each State shall
take measures necessary to establish jurisdiction over offenses committed
on board its registered aircraft. Though the phraseology is ambiguous, its
meaning may be gleaned from the Drafting Committee's minutes. There
devolves upon each contractee the obligation to implement its flag juris-
diction through the enactment of criminal statutes which specify the con-
duct prohibited."' This rule is necessary in that the Convention does not
include an enumeration of proscribed acts. The referral index, therefore,
has to be domestic legislation. However, a sovereign may refuse to enforce
its criminal jurisdiction for any reason it sees fit. It has been suggested
that this point detracts from the Convention's force. Theoretically it does;
practically, it does not. It is rare when a sovereign actually refuses to
exercise jurisdiction over an offense against its penal law when the oppor-
tunity to prosecute presents itself.
Irrespective of the flag State's discretionary powers to prosecute, one
proach to that problem, each article will be thoroughly penetrated as to its meaning, significance,
and scope in the law of international aviation.
"'ICAO Legal Committee, at 79, ICAO Doc. No. 8302-LC/150 (1962).
... Documentation for Diplomatic Conference, Tokyo, Japan, ICAO Doec. No. SR/9.
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point is clear under the Convention. Not only does the flag State possess
a jurisdictional basis for prosecution;' it is also under a conventional duty
to implement that basis through statute."1 It is this statute which is given
force under the auspices of Article 3, section 1. Beyond the mandate of
Article 3, section 2, nothing more is said about flag jurisdiction. As a result,
the sovereign attributes that attend such power are neither expressly or
impliedly circumscribed by the Convention. Notwithstanding the alleged
criminal may be held elsewhere, the flag State not only possesses jurisdiction
to prosecute but also the sovereign power to claim that jurisdiction vis-a-vis
another sovereign claimant."'
The third and last section of Article 3 declares that the Convention does
not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national
law. As a result, the jurisdiction of the flag State co-exists and concurs
with all other jurisdictions that can be raised on legally acknowledged
theories. The State of first landing or that of last departure, the sub-
jacent State, or even the State to which the accused or victim is national,
may claim authority to prosecute under their respective domestic law."7
In lieu of a satisfactory solution, the Convention effectuates an unwielding
jurisdictional concourse, stating as an international rule the basic cause
for the antecedent conflicts. This anomaly would exist were Article 3,
section 3 not amenable to an interpretation consistent with the implied
distinction previously made between jurisdiction itself and the actual
claim to that power vis-a-vis another sovereign."
Chapter II of the Tokyo Convention discusses criminal jurisdiction. In
international thought, the criminal jurisdiction of a State embraces several
different sovereign attributes. There is first the power of the State to
prosecute." 9 This authority usually arises from a criminal statute imple-
menting a recognized jurisdictional basis. Secondly, there is the ability of
the State to claim that jurisdiction as against another sovereign claimant."'
This is but a corollary of sovereignty; for, in international law, every
sovereign by nature has the prerogative vis-a-vis every other sovereign to
claim as its own what it believes is peculiar to itself. Finally, there is the
power of the State to exercise jurisdiction... which is only possible when
"' Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
11Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No, 8364.
"' The Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. i(d), 13 July 1934, 49 Stat. § 3097,
T.S. No. 881 (concluded at Montevideo, 26 Dec. 1933) states: "The State as a person of inter-
national law should possess . . . the capacity to enter into relations with other States." Though
the above passage more precisely refers to the subject of treaties, it embraces any diplomatic dis-
course between States in their international affairs.
"'Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 3, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
" 1See p. 185 supra.
".The Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1(c), 13 July 1934, 49 Stat. § 3097,
T.S. No. 881 (concluded at Montevideo, 26 Dec. 1933). A State is not a State unless it has a
government. The continuance of government, however, is dependent upon the existence of social
order. That order cannot be attained without prosecuting powers in the State.
"'The Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1(d), 13 July 1934, 49 Stat. § 3097,
T.S. No. 881 (concluded at Montevideo, 26 Dec. 1933) states: "The State as a person of inter-
national law should possess . . . the capacity to enter into relations with other States." Though
the above passage more precisely refers to the subject of treaties, it embraces any diplomatic dis-
course between States in their international affairs.
s. This is an obvious concomitant to the power to prosecute.
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the alleged criminal is within the physical control of the prosecuting
State. The concept of criminal jurisdiction, therefore, encompasses three
distinct, correlative powers.
Article 3, section 3 specifically states that the Convention does not
exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with national
law. Such language does not speak in terms of criminal jurisdiction gen-
erally so that the three attributes aforementioned are affected. Rather it
speaks restrictively in terms of one attributive power, namely, that of
jurisdictional execution. This power must presuppose another attribute of
jurisdiction, specifically, the power to prosecute; for without that primary
authority, there would be nothing to execute. However, presupposition
ends here. Article 3, section 3 is phrased in terms of negative inclusion;
it only refers, therefore, to what it does not exclude. It does not state that
criminal jurisdiction is not precluded per se, rather it says the exercise of
that jurisdiction is not excluded, i.e., only one particular attribute of that
jurisdiction. The obvious intent of such language is the exclusion of all
other aspects of criminal jurisdiction which are not intrinsically associated
with jurisdictional execution. Article 3, section 3, therefore, must be read
as excluding from the Convention's approbation any diplomatic juris-
dictional claim made by any State whose claim is based on domestic law.
Its endorsement constitutes an international waiver of such sovereign
power.
Article 3, section 3 literally refers to all contractee States. However, it
has no practical effect upon the flag State. A sovereign claims jurisdiction
vis-a-vis another sovereign in accordance with the Convention,' and not
in accordance with its domestic law. As against the State which has cus-
tody, therefore, the flag State does not waive its sovereign power to claim.
Article 3, section 3, in addition, effects no waiver on the landing State.
Having physical control over the alleged criminal, that sovereign has no
need to raise a diplomatic claim. It may simply exercise jurisdiction in
accordance with its municipal law.'' All other States, however, are affected
by Article 3, section 3. Since they are not the landing State, the exercise of
their respective jurisdictions must wait until the alleged criminal is within
their physical control; and since they are not the flag State, the diplomatic
claim of their respective jurisdictions is not based upon the Convention,
but upon their domestic laws. The power to raise such a claim has been
waived; thus the net effect of Article 3, section 3 is the elimination of sub-
stantial jurisdictional conflicts. When a registered aircraft lands, only the
flag State can claim against any criminal jurisdiction asserted by the land-
ing State. Rather than preserve the problem of conflicts, Article 3, section
3 adequately mitigates it.
12 Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. I & 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 lays the foundation for the
flag State's jurisdiction. Their expression does not impinge upon that State's sovereign power to
raise a diplomatic claim vis-a-vis the landing State. Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 3, ICAO Doc.
No. 8364 refers to domestically founded jurisdiction. As has been pointed out, the implicit effect
of that section results in the waiver of the sovereign power diplomatically to claim jurisdiction
so founded.
"'Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 3, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
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Modeled after Article 19, paragraph 1, of the 1958 Geneva Convention
on the Territorial Sea," 4 Article 4 partially defines the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction by States other than the flag State. A contracting sovereign
which is not the State of registration is denied the right to intervene with
an aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over an
offense committed on board. There are five exceptions: (1) Where the
offense effects that State's territory; (2) where it is committed by or
against one of the State's nationals; (3) where it is against that State's
security; (4) where the offense constitutes a breach of the flight regula-
tions in force in that State; and (5) where the exercise of jurisdiction is
that's State's obligation under a multilateral international agreement."
Upon analysis, it appears that Article 4 does not disrupt the purported
effect of Article 3. That latter provision operates to make the flag State's
jurisdiction concurrent with all other jurisdictions that can be raised on
feasible grounds. Jurisdictional conflicts are substantially dispelled. Diplo-
matic claims of jurisdiction are waived. Article 4, on the other hand, is
not concerned with the sovereign power of a State to raise a claim. To the
contrary, it is directed at another attribute of criminal jurisdiction. It
simply addresses itself to the in-flight exercise of recognized jurisdictions
foreign to the aircraft's nationality, and thereby it expressly relegates
their attempted enforcement to five possibilities when the aeroplane is in
flight. Where the crime effects a State's territory or its aeronautical regula-
tions, the State may intercept the flight. The Convention thus takes cog-
nizance of the principle of territoriality as modified by the attendant con-
sideration, national interest.126 Yet because traditional international law
conforms the exercise of jurisdiction to sovereign territory, interference
may not occur within the airspace of another State."' When a crime is
committed by or against a national of a State, that sovereign may interfere
thus giving effect to the principle of active and passive personality."M
International law restricts this interference to sovereign airspace and
when the exercise of jurisdiction is mandated by multilateral treaty, the
State under Article 4 may intercept. Also where national security dictates
action, the principle of protection is underscored." However international
law limits interference to the State's territory. This cursory review reflects
that the document drafted at Tokyo excepts to the jurisdiction of the flag
State under several jurisdictional bases. Each basis is subservient to the
extentions of sovereignty as delineated by international law. Regardless
of the jurisdictional ground a State asserts under Article 4, the execution
of an interception must take place within its airspace. There is one
exception. Since the international rule relevant to flight interference only
forbids trespass within sovereign air territory, a State which intercepts a
114 Convention on the High Seas, 30 Sept. 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, (concluded
at Geneva, 29 April 1958).
" Tokyo Convention, art. 4, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
120 Niemeyer, supra note 98.
"'J. COOPER, THE RIGHT To FLY 291 (1947).
128 Gutierrez, supra note 1.
129 Id.
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flight over the High Seas may do so under the auspices of the Convention.
Thus, the power of any non-flag State to exert its criminal jurisdiction in
the air is narrowed by Article 4 to specific exceptions that are solely call-
able when the aircraft is in flight, over the State's aerial confines or those
of the High Seas.
In essence, Article 4 limits the power of a subjacent, non-flag State to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction within its own territory. Affording juris-
diction under many legal theories, it restrains the exercise of that authority
through stringently fixed conditions. The State subjacent to the aircraft is
restricted to flight interception, and then only when a certain state of
prescribed facts exists and appertains to the underlying sovereign. Because
of this and the fact that the landing procedes knowledge of the offense,
the power left to the subjacent, non-flag State is hardly executable. Article
4, in addition, implicitly effects a result more significant than that coming
from its express provisions; it engenders reaffirmance of the conventional
waiver respecting diplomatic jurisdictional claims. The interceptive exer-
cise of criminal jurisdiction is the only subject matter that Article 4 dis-
cusses, therefore, it is not concerned with the "conventional" exercise of
that power."' ° Even though a plane leaves the subjacent State's airspace
before an interception occurs, that sovereign's power to exercise jurisdiction
does not terminate. Since Article 4 only governs the act of interception, a
subsequent execution of jurisdiction is pursuable under the authority of
Article 3, section 3. Relegation to this section, however, has two effects.
The non-flag, subjacent State must wait until it has physical control over
the alleged criminals before it can exercise jurisdiction."' 1 That State auto-
matically waives its sovereign power to claim jurisdiction vis-a-vis the
custodial State. Article 4, resultingly, does not impinge upon the effect of
Article 3, section 3. Rather, it incorporates it by inference.
Article 3, section 3 suppresses the diplomatic claims of all States having
jurisdiction to prosecute except those raised by the flag State.' The article
by itself, therefore, does not fully eliminate jurisdictional conflicts. After
scheduled landing, interception, or forced landing, the landing State may
decide to exercise criminal jurisdiction in accordance with its domestic
law."' Against this purported exercise, the flag State can diplomatically
claim.3 4 An actual conflict arises which the Convention solves impliedly.
"'Conventional exercise in this respect means the normal manner in which the jurisdiction
of a sovereign is exercised. The normal manner is arrest upon warrant once the alleged criminal
comes within the territorial confines of the State.
13' One State cannot exercise its judicial jurisdiction within the territory of another State even
though it is said to have extra-territorial jurisdiction over the act or the person. Such action would
violate the sovereignty of the latter State. Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
"'Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. I & 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 lays the foundation for the
flag State's jurisdiction. Their expression does not impinge upon that State's sovereign power to
raise a diplomatic claim vis-a-vis the landing State. Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 3, ICAO Doc.
No. 8364 refers to domestically founded jurisdiction. As has been pointed out, the implicit effect
of that section results in the waiver of the sovereign power diplomatically to claim jurisdiction so
founded.
"S' Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 3, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
134Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. I & 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 lays the foundation for the
flag State's jurisdiction. Their expression does not impinge upon that State's sovereign power to
raise a diplomatic claim vis-a-vis the landing State. Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 3, ICAO
Doc. No. 8364 refers to domestically founded jurisdiction. As has been pointed out, the implicit
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Without further resort to waiver, it proffers a solution not intended by
the drafters of the Tokyo Convention. The provisions of the document,
when co-ordinated, establish an implicit system of priorities."
During the flight, the State of registry possesses jurisdiction, over on-
board crimes, concurrent with all others that can be raised on feasible
grounds by non-flag sovereigns."3' The non-execution of a legitimate inter-
ception, moreover, does not divest any non-registry State of its respective
concurrent powers." 7 After a scheduled or forced landing, however, only
two sovereigns are directly involved in the immediate jurisdictional ques-
tion even though other States may possess the power to prosecute. The
landing State may exercise jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3, section 318
The flag State may claim against this purported power pursuant to Article
3, section 1 and section 2.' As for all other States involved, Article 3,
section 3 waives their sovereign power to raise diplomatic claims vis-a-vis
the landing State. " ' Even if those sovereigns have extradition treaties
with the landing State, these documents are inoperative to the situation
because the Tokyo Convention deems the crime to be committed in the
territory of the registry State."1'
Jurisdictional conflict between the flag State and the landing State arises
once the former sovereign tenders its claim through diplomatic channels.
If there exists an extradition treaty between those sovereigns which speci-
fies as an extraditable offense the crime committed, the conflict is ended.
When no appropriate treaty can be found, however, diplomatic discord
results unless the landing State extradites through comity. " ' To avoid any
conflict the Tokyo Convention advances its formula: Article 13, section 4
and section 5, impose upon the landing State the duty to conduct a pre-
liminary hearing and the obligation to determine whether it will take
jurisdiction vel non."' The conclusion is clear that the landing State is
effect of that section results in the waiver of the sovereign power diplomatically to claim juris-
diction so founded.
I Boyle & Pulsifer, supra note 1, at 327. The majority of drafters were opposed to a system
of priorities.
13' Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 establishes flag jurisdiction through
mandate. Art. 3, para. 3, sanctions the exercise of jurisdiction by any State in accordance with
its domestic law. There can be no exercise unless jurisdiction is first established by domestic law.
As a result, art. 3 in toto fosters multiple competences.
... They may subsequently exercise their respective jurisdictions pursuant to Tokyo Convention,
art. 3, para. 3, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
... This, of course, depends upon its municipal law.
... Those sections do not impinge upon the sovereign power to claim diplomatically vis-a-vis
another State.
"'Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 1 & 2, ICAO Doe. No. 8364 lays the foundation for the
flag State's sovereign power to raise a diplomatic claim vis-a-vis the landing State. Tokyo Conven-
tion, art. 3, para. 3, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 refers to domestically founded jurisdiction. As has
been pointed out, the implicit effect of that section results in the waiver of the sovereign power
diplomatically to claim jurisdiction so founded. Any State whose jurisdiction is based upon
domestic law and not the Convention itself, waives its sovereign power to claim diplomatically
vis-a-vis the landing State.
141 Tokyo Convention, art. 16, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 states:
1. Offenses committed on aircraft registered in a Contracting State shall be treated,
for the purpose of extradition, as if they had been committed not only in the place
in which they have occurred but also in the territory of the State of registration
of the aircraft.
14 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
"3 Tokyo Convention, art. 13, para. 5, ICAO Doe. No. 8364. The State which makes the
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vested with an exclusive original jurisdiction to decide whether it should
exercise its concurrent criminal jurisdiction. This exclusive authority is
precedent and also distinct from that sovereign's power to prosecute. '4
The flag State may still raise its claim of jurisdiction vis-a-vis the landing
State's criminal jurisdiction. But the quality of its assertion radically de-
parts from the usual nature of sovereign claim. The flag State, through
ratification, becomes a contractee to the Convention. It submits itself,
consequently, to the authority of Article 13, thus sanctioning the exclu-
sive jurisdiction mentioned above. As a result, its jurisdictional claim is
no longer a diplomatic challenge, as such contention would render the
sanction of Article 13 by the flag State meaningless. To the contrary, its
claim can only be one of many factors tendered to the landing State to
facilitate it in its jurisdictional decision. With this transposition of sov-
ereign claim to the status of considered fact, the flag State's position be-
comes tantamount to that of any non-registry State under Article 3,
section 3." Jurisdictional conflicts disappear, thus under the Convention
the landing State is invested with exclusive original jurisdiction to decide
whether it should exercise its criminal jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the
possibility that that latter power may be concurrent with others, no
diplomatic challenge can be tendered against an affirmative decision. Fur-
thermore, only an extradition treaty with the flag State necessitates man-
datory abnegation. " ' The net effect of this analysis is ordination to a sys-
tem of priorities. The landing State has primary jurisdiction immediately
exercisable after self-confirmation and all other States possess concurrent
jurisdiction exercisable only on condition that they subsequently obtain
physical control over the alleged criminal.
C. The Remaining Problem
With the establishment of a jurisdictional order uncomplicated by
diplomatic claims, the Tokyo Convention proffers to international avia-
tion a lucid and internationally sound method for the administration of
criminal law. In the scheme set forth above, however, there appears to be
one defect unprovided for. The landing State may decide that it has no
internationally sanctioned jurisdictional basis upon which to prosecute.
Without extradition, it must either deport the accused... or free him. "
preliminary inquiry contemplated in paragraph 4 of this article shall promptly report its findings
to said States (registry State and State of the person's nationality) and shall indicate whether it
intends to exercise jurisdiction,
144 The exclusive, original jurisdiction of the landing State arises under Tokyo Convention, art.
13, para. 5, ICAO Doc. No. 8364. The criminal jurisdiction of the landing State arises under
art. 3, para. 3. The former is determinative of the exercise of the latter.
145 This point is most significant in connection with the discussion which will follow in the
next section. Though the Convention outwardly favors a flag jurisdiction, it nevertheless implicitly
shifts the balance of judicial power to the landing State.
14' An extradition treaty is an internationally binding compact between the respective signa-
tories. It creates the right of one independent nation to' demand from another the return of an
alleged fugitive from justice and the correlative duty to surrender the fugitive to the demanding
country. U.S. v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886).
1. Tokyo Convention, art. 14, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
14 Tokyo Convention, art. 15, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 states:
1. Without prejudice to Article 14, any person who has been disembarked in accord-
ance with Article 8, paragraph 1, or delivered in accordance with Article 9, para-
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It is submitted that, when the United States is the landing sovereign, it
possesses jurisdiction to prosecute, and its courts have jurisdiction to
adjudicate."
IV. THE PROBLEM OF PROSECUTION
After a landing contractee takes custody pursuant to the Tokyo Con-
vention, it has several alternatives. Apart from the Convention, it must
extradite the accused if there is an appropriate extradition treaty with the
flag State. Where none exists, its action is dictated by provisions in the
Convention. It may admit the accused into its territory if it so desires;' °
however, admission would only subvert the purpose underlying the Con-
vention and question the international integrity of the sovereign. On the
other hand, it may deport the accused, but only if he is not a citizen or
resident alien. ' Deportation may be to either the State of nationality or
the State of flight embarkation.' 2 If neither State has an appropriate extra-
dition treaty with the flag State or if neither possesses jurisdiction to prose-
cute, deportion is futile. In some situations, therefore, the non-resident
alien is in the same position as the citizen or resident alien in respect to
immunity from immediate criminal prosecution. Under Article 15, section
1 of the Convention, the accused must be freed unless his presence is re-
quired by the law of the State of landing for extradition or criminal pro-
ceedings. Therefore, the assertion by the landing sovereign to exercise
criminal jurisdiction remains the final avenue through which those persons
may be brought to justice. This presupposes that that sovereign possesses
jurisdiction to prosecute.
If the United States were landing sovereign, it would possess criminal
jurisdiction over any person who committed an in-flight crime on board
an American registered aircraft during international flight. ' Beyond this
fact pattern, its jurisdiction to prosecute is not clear. When the aircraft
is of foreign registry, it may be argued that the nationality of the offender
or the victim constitutes a sufficient basis upon which criminal proceedings
may be supported."' However, when those persons are both non-resident
aliens, any type of criminal prosecution seems wholly unsupportable. If
federal jurisdiction over the non-resident alien can be validated, then it
must embrace the American citizen or resident alien. For example, one
non-resident alien murders another non-resident alien on board a foreign
aircraft flying from Paris to New York; the crime is perpetrated over the
graph 1, or has disembarked after committing an act contemplated in Article 11,
paragraph I, and who desires to continue his journey shall be at liberty as soon as
practicable to proceed to any destination of his choice unless his presence is required
by the law of the State of landing for the purpose of extradition or criminal pro-
ceedings.
14 Any qualification to this statement will be explained in the next section.
.. Tokyo Convention, art. 14, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
151 Id.
15 Id.
.. Criminal jurisdiction would be supported under Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 1, ICAO
Doe. No. 8364.
... The active and passive personality doctrines of criminal jurisdiction would be raised in
argument.
1969]
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High Seas; no extradition treaty exists between the United States and the
flag sovereign. If the United States can constitutionally exercise criminal
jurisdiction over the accused in this case, the custodial duty of the Con-
vention will be wholly complemented. All avenues of escape from prose-
cution will evanesce. Ratification would then be most desirable; federal
power would fuse with the international Convention to effectively combat
international air crimes.
The Tokyo Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exer-
cised in accordance with national law; 1' the legitimacy of the exercise
depends upon the dictates of that municipal law. In the federal system,
the valid exercise of criminal jurisdiction is predicated upon the proper
United States district court" possessing juidicial jurisdiction to hear the
controversy. This judicial jurisdiction looks for its validity to three essen-
tial factors. First, the accused must be in the custody of the court.15 ' Since
federal judicial power is limited partially to cases arising under the laws
of the United States,15 the accused must also be charged with a violation
of federal penal law.15 ' Finally, there must exist a recognized jurisdictional
basis upon which jurisdictional exercise can be sanctioned.16 Without this
nexus between the prosecuting sovereign and the alleged criminal, fed-
eral courts decline jurisdiction. 1
When a non-resident alien is delivered to the competent United States
authorities pursuant to the Convention, that landing sovereign must take
custody of the person if circumstances so warrant.6 ' Delivery, however, is
made for a violation of the penal laws of the flag State.16 Since the courts
114of one country do not enforce the criminal laws of another sovereign,
if district courts claim judicial jurisdiction the violation of flag penal law
must also be an offense against federal criminal law. Presently, the United
States Criminal Code proscribes a number of in-flight crimes,'" of which
"' Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 3, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
156Proper court refers to venue. For air crimes, Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 903(a),
72 Stat. 786 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1473 (1964), is the applicable section. It states:
The trial of any offense under this Act shall be in the district in which such offense
is committed; or, if the offense is committed out of the jurisdiction of any particular
State or district, the trial shall be in the district where the offender . . . is arrested
or is first brought.
1 57In Re Morgan, 80 F. Supp. 810 (N.D. Iowa, 1948). Arrest of a person on the ground
that he is guilty of an offense interdicted by statute is the first step in, and an integral part of,
the process of bringing such person before the court of that sovereignty whose statute has been
violated, and when an arrest has been made for such object or purpose, the jurisdiction of the
particular court is then invoked.
.. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; C. WRIGHT, supra note 75, at 59.
159 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1964). Federal district courts are given, by statute, original jurisdiction,
exclusive of the state courts, of all offenses against laws of the United States.
10 Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra note 69, at 445.
"' U.S. v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
162Tokyo Convention, art. 13, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364 states:
This is conventional custody pursuant to treaty. It is to be distinguished from judicial
custody pursuant to federal statute. It is this latter type of custody that is needed for
federal judicial jurisdiction.
'Tokyo Convention, art. 9, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
164 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 723 (1825). See generally Leflar, Extrastate Enforce-
ment of Penal and Government Claims, 46 HARV. L. REv. 193 (1932).
165 See generally Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902, 72 Stat. 784 (1958), as amended, 49
U.S.C. § 1472 (1964).
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ten are but basic offenses outlawed by all civilized countries: assault, '
maiming, ' " larceny,' receiving stolen goods,6
9 murder, ' - manslaughter, 17 1
attempts to commit murder or manslaughter," ' rape, ' carnal knowl-
edge, 4 and robbery.' When a non-resident alien is delivered to American
authorities for a basic crime under flag penal law his act probably also
contravenes the federal criminal code. If so, he can be charged with a viola-
tion of the laws of the United States.' Conventional custody can then be
converted into judicial custody upon issuing an arrest warrant.77 As a
result, two of the three elements indispensible to judicial jurisdiction foster
no particular problem. With the third, difficulty arises.
The federal statute upon which prosecution is founded embraces the
non-resident alien traveling on board a foreign aircraft. It states that
any person becomes amenable to punishment who commits those crimes
171
aforementioned while on board any aircraft in flight in air commerce.
Though the non-resident alien is made subject to the statute, it is the
precise meaning assigned to the words "air commerce" that determines
the judicial jurisdiction of federal courts over such persons. Those words
are partially defined in terms of foreign air commerce. 9 In turn, this
concept means the carriage for compensation of persons by aircraft in
commerce between a place in the United States and any place outside
thereof." Air commerce, resultingly, is a new jurisdictional basis proffered
by Congress to invest the federal district courts with judicial jurisdiction
over an alien whose federal crime is perpetrated on a foreign aircraft out-
side the airspace of the United States.' Its postulation is strictly novel as
traditionally the rule of criminal law has been that the offense must be
committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the sovereign seeking to
try the crime in order to give that sovereign jurisdiction.'
The Congress no doubt enacted the legislation pursuant to lawful
"'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902(k) (1), 72 Stat. 784 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §
1472 (1964). This section incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. § 113 (1964).
167 Id. This section incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. § 114.
.. Id. This section incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. § 661.
16. Id. This section incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. § 662.
"0 Id. This section incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
11 Id. This section incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. § 1112.
171 Id. This section incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. § 1113.
13 Id. This section incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. § 2031.
".. Id. This section incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. § 2032.
' Id. This section incorporates by reference 18 U.S.C. § 2111.
176 FED. R. CRIM. P. 3.
177 FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.
17 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902(k) (1), 72 Stat. 784 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §
1472 (1964).
17 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101(4), 72 Stat. 737 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §
1301 (1964).
"0 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101(20), 72 Stat. 737 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §
1301 (1964).
18' An example will clarify. If an alien murders another alien on board a French aircraft while
the plane is over the high seas on route from Paris to New York, a federal crime will have been
committed by any person on board any aircraft flying from a point outside the United States
and a point within. For such a case, the federal statute purports to give the district court juris-
diction by the sole fact of the aircraft's route.
... Yenkichi Ito v. U.S., 64 F.2d 73, 75 (9th Cir. 1933); U.S. v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546,
547 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
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authority." This fact, however, does not necessitate the conclusion that
its applicability is constitutional."' A very tenable defense is that the
statute, as applied to the present case, violates the Fifth Amendment."
The attack embodies the assertion that there is a denial of due process of
law to the alien' in that the district court has no recourse to a valid
jurisdictional basis upon which to try the case."' Supporting this contention
is the rule that the laws of a nation can not justly extend beyond its own
territory except so far as regards its own citizens.'8' Federal courts rarely
claim jurisdiction over an offense perpetrated outside the United States by
an alien."' When they do, they justify their action under the protective
principle of criminal jurisdiction."' Moreover, no federal court has ever
taken jurisdiction over an alien unless there existed between the United
States and that person some substantial contact sanctioned under either
the territorial or the protective principle."' Until the present, valid juris-
tional bases have been predicated upon and equated with those two theories.
Today, jurisdiction is founded on air commerce. That jurisdictional basis,
complete in itself, does not rely on either one of those principles afore-
mentioned; rather it seeks to establish criminal jurisdiction over an alien
through the contact of his air transit from outside the United States to
within."' In view of prior federal practice, therefore, it would seem that
the criminal jurisdiction fostered by air commerce is unconstitutional as
violative of due process.
The argument in defense is specious as it assumes that the territorial
and the protective principles are exclusive and exhaustive. Congress pos-
sesses the delegated power to regulate commerce with foreign nations...
as well as the implied power necessary and proper to carry into effect that
... U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 states that "The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate commerce
with foreign nations ....
184 A statute may be valid under one set of facts, but not another; it may be valid as to one
class of persons, but not another. Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958). A law which is
constitutional as applied in one manner may violate the Constitution when applied in another.
Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945).
" U.S. CONST. amend. V states: "[N]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law."
".. Aliens, as well as citizens, are entitled to the protection of the Fifth Amendment of the
Federal Constitution. U.S. v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 228 (1942).
"'U.S. v. Dollar, 100 F. Supp. 881, 886 (N.D. Cal. 1951). "Due process requires that a per-
son shall have an opportunity to be heard by a court of competent jurisdiction."
"'The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 111 (1824).
9 U.S. v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1955):
[A)n American is subject to the laws of the United States wherever he may be,
U.S. v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922), but an alien outside the territory of the
sovereign is not so accountable.
'"Rocha v. U.S., 288 F.2d 545, 549 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961). Also at
548, citing Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911): "'Acts done outside a jurisdiction, but in-
tended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a state in punishing the cause
of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in getting him
within its power.' "
1. U.S. v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); all cases subsequent to this one dealt
with the protective principle. Rocha v. U.S., 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948
(1961); U.S. v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960); but see Rivard v. U.S., 375 F.2d
882 (5th Cir. 1967), which discussed the objective view of the territorial principle.
192 Supra note 181.
'" U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8: "Congress shall have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign
nations .... "
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express delegation."" Since power over foreign commerce is a necessary
attribute flowing from sovereignty,"5 Congress also possesses the inherent
power to govern that matter irrespective of the affirmative constitutional
grant."6 Vested with three concentric powers over foreign commercial
affairs, Congress may actualize them to their full, legitimate extent and
in accomplishing this, it is not restricted to constitutional provisions."" It
may simply choose from the corpus of international law whatever recog-
nized principle of international jurisdiction it deems necessary for the
execution of those powers.9 ' The fact that, in the past, Congress may not
have chosen to embody in its foreign commerce legislation the full scope
of its authorized powers is no basis for concluding that those powers can
no longer be extended to otherwise legitimate limits."' Disuse of delegated
or inherent power offers no conclusion that that power may not subse-
quently be employed in a new but proper fashion.' As a result, even
though the congressional power over foreign commerce in its criminal
extensions has been modified solely by the territorial and protective
principles,"' it is fallacious to state that it is relegated exclusively to those
theories. When that power is employed to establish criminal jurisdiction
over aliens, Congress may rightfully incorporate into its legislation any
other recognized doctrine of international law to legitimately secure fed-
eral judicial jurisdiction.'' In 1961, Congress, pursuant to its foreign
'" U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "Congress shall have power . . . to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers .... "
".. The Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 1 (d), 13 July 1934, 49 Star. § 3097,
T.S. No. 881 (concluded at Montevideo, 26 Dec. 1933). The State as a person of international
law should possess the capacity to enter into relations with other States.
196 "'The powers of the government and the Congress in regard to sovereignty are broader
than the powers possessed in relation to internal matters.' " Rocha v. U.S., 288 F.2d 545, 549 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961); U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936) states:
it results that the investment of the federal government with the powers of external
sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The
powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain
diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in
the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary con-
comitants of nationality.
"..Rocha v. U.S., 288 F.2d 545, 549 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961). The court
here sanctioned the utilization of the protective principle without recourse to constitutional au-
thorization. It predicated its conclusion solely on international law, stating that any reliance on
the Constitution was unnecessary. This reasoning is consistent with the assertions made in U.S. v.
Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Since the power over foreign commerce is inherent as well
as delegated, it would have vested in the federal government regardless of the Constitution. Its
implementation, therefore, is predicated on the dictates of international law. This proposition is
sound in view of the fact that nowhere in United States organic law is there provision for the
territorial principle. But from the beginning of the republic that principle has been employed with-
out hesitancy in criminal matters.
"'U.S. v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 491 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
199 Id.
... Id. This case cited Draft Convention on jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra note 69,
at 556:
The contention advanced by certain Anglo-American writers that jurisdiction over
aliens is restricted to those within the territory and to pirates appears to be the
result of a tendency to equate the exercise of jurisdiction undertaken in a particular
State with competence as determined by international law.
The project points out that the two are not co-terminous or equivalents.
"1 U.S. v. Baker, 136 F. Supp. 546, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); all cases subsequent to this one
dealt with the protective principle. Rocha v. U.S., 288 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
948 (1961); U.S. v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479 (S.D. Cal. 1960); but see Rivard v. U.S., 375
F.2d 882 (5th Cir. 1967), which discussed the objective view of the territorial principle.
210 U.S. v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 491 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
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commerce power, legislated in respect to in-flight crimes.2"' It extended the
jurisdiction of the district courts over any person who perpetrated those
offenses on board any aircraft. Its basis was air commerce. No disputation
is made that federal courts do not possess jurisdiction over aliens who
commit federal crimes in foreign territory." ' When a court claims that
jurisdiction, it does so by evoking the protective principle. In respect to
in-flight crimes, however, this principle is neither necessarily nor usually
applicable.2" Thus, whether those tribunals possess judicial jurisdiction
over aliens under the circumstances stated depends on the interpretation
given air commerce. If that interpretation can be equated with a recog-
nized jurisdictional basis, the argument emanating from the Fifth Amend-
ment fails, for due process is then afforded.
Air commerce statutorily means the commercial transit of any aircraft
between a place outside the United States and a place within.'° It is the
basis to secure federal judicial jurisdiction over any person who commits
an in-flight crime under the Federal Aviation Act. 7 Theoretically, it may
be interpreted to reach aliens who never come in physical contact with
the United States during their air transit."' Jurisdiction predicated upon
such an interpretation, however, would face high constitutional challenge.
Since the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to save and not to des-
troy, 09 extremism should be avoided. Air commerce should be construed
to afford the most extensive jurisdiction without contravening constitu-
tional limits. An interpretation which complies with this formula is one
which equates air commerce for purposes of criminal jurisdiction with
place of landing. Such a construction is legitimate; for, the landing of an
international flight in the United States terminates transit between a place
outside that sovereign and some place within. However, whether it is
tantamount to recognize jurisdictional basis so as not to offend the Fifth
Amendment is a question dependent on international law.
Five different competences under which crime may be prosecuted are
recognized by international law. 10 Of those jurisdictional bases, the uni-
versality principle of criminal jurisdiction is pertinent. " ' It provides that
a State possesses jurisdiction over any crime committed by an alien not-
withstanding the fact that the crime was perpetrated in a place subject
to the authority of another sovereign. 12 Certain conditions, however, must
be met. The act which constitutes the crime under the law of the prosecut-
ing State must also be an offense under the law of locus delicti. Prosecution,
203 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902, 72 Stat. 784 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1472
(1964).2 U.S. v. Rodriguez, 182 F. Supp. 479, 491 (S.D. Cal. 1960).
... Murder, rape, larceny, etc. are not crimes directed against the sovereignty of the United
States.
2. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101(4), 72 Stat. 737 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. 5
1301 (1964). This section incorporates by reference § 101 (20) (c).
207 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902, 72 Stat. 784 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1472
(1964).
"'Mendelsohn, supra note 1, at 536-37.
255 U.S. v. Menasche, 348 U.S. $28 (1955).
21Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra note 69, at 445.




furthermore, must not be barred under that latter law through a lapse
of time. Lastly, an offer of extradition must be made and subsequently
refused. When these several conditions are met, international law affords
criminal jurisdiction by a reference to the sole factor of custody.1 It is
to be noted, though, that the necessity of the last condition is doubtful
when the universal principle is referred to international aviation law. If
this can be proved, a new species of that principle emerges upon which
the exercise of criminal jurisdiction can be justified.
High international authority has long contended that jurisdiction over
in-flight crimes is supportable solely on the custody of the landing sov-
ereign. Morpurgo, " Lortsch," and Pholien"' initially advanced the propo-
sition. Nowhere in their arguments was such jurisdiction conditioned upon
an offer of extradition under the comity of nations."' It was predicated
upon the contact of landing as complemented by custody. Contending that
the activity of international flight could oftentimes afford an in-flight
criminal respite from any prosecution,"'8 those jurists evoked the pure form
of the universal principle.12 Recently, Mr. Allan Mendelsohn, a United
States delegate to the Tokyo Convention, advanced a well reasoned thesis
urging the Congress to amend the Federal Aviation Act.Y In lieu of the
words air commerce, he proposed the adoption of a phrase which essentially
means place of landing. This proposition was supported by the Legal
Working Group of the I.G.I.A.' No mention of an obligation to offer
extradition, was made. Again, custody of the landing sovereign was ten-
dered as the sole and unconditioned basis upon which federal jurisdiction
was sanctioned. Paradoxically, even the legislation which Mendelsohn
attacked endorses the contention that the place of landing possesses un-
fettered jurisdiction over in-flight crimes. Under both its liberal construc-
tion2  and the statutory intent, 2 2  air commerce, a concept proffered by
Congress itself, is legitimately amenable to an interpretation of place of
landing. The statute in which it is found, moreover, does not speak in
terms of extradition."4 Another persuasive argument for the competence
2" Rocha v. U.S., 288 F.2d 545, 549, n.4 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 948 (1961).
214 Morpurgo, Conflicts internationaux de jurisdiction en matiere penal aeronautique, 1928
REVUE JURIDIQUE INTERNATIONALE DE LA LOCOMOTION AERIENNE 399.
215 Lortsch, Statut juridique du passager d' aeronef, 13 REvUE O DRoIT AERIEN 7 (1929).
210 Pholien, supra note 99, at 289.
21 31 AM. JUR. 2d Extradition § 13 (1967).
21 If the landing State has no extradition treaty with the flag State, the criminal will be set
free.
211 Jurisdiction based solely on custody, as is the case for the international crime of piracy.
Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra note 69, at 563.
2 Mendelsohn, supra note 1.
2 The United States Interagency Group on International Aviation. It usually includes the De-
partments of State, Defense, and Commerce, the CAB and the FAA. The IGIA Legal Working
Group is made up of the legal representatives of the participating IGIA members.
22
2 See p. 198 supra.
213 Hearings on H.R. 8384 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961):
[T]he definition of "air commerce" in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, will operate
to make certain of its provisions applicable . . . to such acts committed on foreign
aircraft in flight in air commerce over foreign countries, but only if such aircraft are
engaged in flights originating at or destined to points in the United States.2 2 4 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 902(k) (1), 72 Stat. 784 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
1472 (1964).
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is that the Convention drafted at Tokyo, though allowing for multiple
jurisdictions, makes the landing State the fulcrum of its thrust. Under
the Convention, the sovereign has the duty of custody upon delivery,2"
the power to deport on its own discretion," and the authority of decision
in respect to the exercise of its own criminal jurisdiction."' Notwithstand-
ing that landing jurisdiction per se is not provided for in the Convention,22"
it is not by that fact ruled out.' And when it is realized that that State
is the most important sovereign under that draft, its status alone practic-
ably argues for the jurisdiction suggested. The outstanding deficiency in
the Tokyo Convention only serves to re-enforce this point." ° More im-
portant, if such jurisdiction is admitted, then under that Convention, it
is predicated solely on custody"' and is in no way pre-conditioned upon
an offer of extradition."'
The foregoing considerations strongly indicate that the universal prin-
ciple is modified when applied to the area of international aviation. Tradi-
tionally, criminal jurisdiction founded on it is conditioned on two major
factors: Custody of the accused and a rejected offer of extradition. 3 How-
ever, when that principle appertains to air crimes committed during inter-
national flight,"4 cogent authority dispenses with the second requirement.
Where the contact is landing, such authority sanctions the perfection of
the universal basis through custody alone. Thus, it may be concluded
that that principle is qualified when used to support jurisdiction over air
offenses. Indeed, the unique criminal problem which may attend an inter-
national flight demands this result." A new jurisdictional basis arises,
special only to in-flight crimes perpetrated during international flight.
That basis is but the actual custody of the accused upon the contact of
landing.
Though this new and special jurisdictional basis is supported by high
authority, the approbation of its validity depends wholly upon international
law. According to the landmark case S.S. Lotus, a jurisdictional basis must
be neither proscribed by a rule of general international law, nor prohibited
under customary international law."' In that international sources favor
the new basis, there exists no rule of general proscription. Further, in that
22 Tokyo Convention, art. 13, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
2 Tokyo Convention, art. 14, para. 1, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
227 Tokyo Convention, art. 13, para. 5, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
.. Boyle & Pulsifer, suPra note 1, at 319, 324.
.. Tokyo Convention, art. 3, para. 3, ICAO Doc. No. 8364.
22. As has already been pointed out, there are situations where the Tokyo Convention in itself
does not assure prosecution.
.a Tokyo Convention, art. 13, para. 2, ICAO Doe. No. 8364.
..2 Tokyo Convention, art. 16, para. 2, ICAO Doc. No. 8364: "[N]othing in this Convention
shall be deemed to create an obligation to grant extradition."
222 See p. 198 supra. It is being taken for granted in the statement that the act which consti-
tutes the crime is also an offense by the law of the place where it was committed.
'a International flight is a factor implicit in the whole discussion. It is defined with respect to
the Tokyo Convention, pp. 174-75 supra.
21 Where no extradition treaty exists between the landing sovereign and the flag State, the ac-
cused must be set free unless the landing sovereign possesses jurisdiction to prosecute and indicates
its intention to initiate criminal proceedings.
... Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
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the flag State possesses no exclusive jurisdiction over in-flight offenses,"7
there is not a customary prohibition. The special doctrine, therefore,
emerges as a permissible basis under international case law. Since it is a
corollary to the internationally recognized basis of universality, it partakes,
moreover, of that latter principle's status. As a result, it becomes part of
the jurisprudential body of international criminal law.
Since custody upon the contact of landing is a valid jurisdictional basis,
Congress may adopt it to support federal judicial jurisdiction over in-flight
crimes committed by aliens on board foreign aircraft. At present, Con-
gress pretends to bestow such jurisdiction through the nexus of air com-
merce; but that concept is too vague. Though it can be legitimately
interpreted to mean place of landing, it is also susceptible to other con-
structions which are clearly unconstitutional.s The question then pre-
sents itself: in what manner is the new and special jurisdictional basis
assigned to air commerce to dispel the Fifth Amendment argument?
Federal crimes present federal questions.s When district courts exercise
federal question jurisdiction, they may resort to federal common law as
the rule of decision.'" Thus, it is significant that the landing basis of
criminal jurisdiction is part of international law; for, international law
itself is part of the law of the United States."41 As federal law, therefore,
it must by nature be an integral of federal common law." * To prevent
the demise of a criminal statute on the grounds of vagueness, federal com-
mon law is used to define and clarify the terms questioned.' International
law as federal common law, therefore, is available to eliminate statutory
vagueness. More particularly, it may define and clarify the meaning of
... Tokyo Convention, art. 3 & 4, ICAO Doc. No. 8364. The Convention allows for concurrent
jurisdiction.
"8 Where a non-resident alien perpetrates a crime injuring another non-resident alien on board
a foreign aircraft flying from New York to Paris, there are no substantial contacts with the United
States. Landing and custody take place in France. The elements constituting the new jurisdictional
basis occur outside the United States. To support federal jurisdiction, they must occur within.
With the above fact pattern in mind, reference is made to the definition of air commerce. Fed-
eral Aviation Act of 1958, § 101(4) & (20)(c), 72 Stat. 737 (1958), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1301 (1964), define it as commercial air carriage between a place in the United States and any
place outside thereof. As a result, air commerce literally embraces the above flight pattern.
239 C. WRIGHT, supra note 75, at 59.
245Hinderlider v. La Plata River and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938).
Brandeis stated that in federal question jurisdiction, there exists a body of federal common law.
2"4 Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 72 (1940); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1906):
'International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly pre-
sented for their determination,' " citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1899).
242 West Rand Cent. Gold Mine Co. v. Rex (Eng.), 2 KB 391 (1905): "International law . . .
forms part of the law of England." "And the greater part of the common law in the United
States is derived from the common or unwritten law of England." 1 SA C.J.S. Common Law, §
3 (1967).
243 In Re Green, 52 F. 104, 111 (Cir. Ct. Ohio 1892):
When Congress . . . adopts . . . common law offenses, the courts may properly
look to that body of jurisprudence for the true meaning and definition of such
crimes, if they are not clearly defined in the act creating them.
The importance of the above statement is not just that common law may be used to define offenses
in a criminal statute. Even more important than that is the general principle upon which that
statement is based. Common law, where it is relevant, may be employed to clarify terms in a crimi-
nal statute in order to save it from vagueness. From such a principle, it may then be argued that
international law as federal common law may be employed to define terms in a federal criminal
statute which terms have international implications. Most certainly, air commerce possesses such
implications. See also U.S. v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407 (1957).
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air commerce as that term is used in federal criminal legislation. There is
but one proviso: Air commerce, as defined by statute, must be susceptible
to the importation tendered by international law. Air commerce can
legitimately be construed as place of landing. International law admits
place of landing as a valid jurisdictional basis. As a result, it eliminates the
extreme interpretations postulated on air commerce and clarifies that term
to recognized limits. When air commerce is referred to aliens on board
foreign aircraft, therefore, its meaning becomes place of landing. 44 With
that term tantamount to a valid basis for criminal jurisdiction, the argu-
ment premised on the Fifth Amendment fails. It may be finally stated
that, once custody is secured upon the contact of landing, district courts
possess judicial jurisdiction to hear cases involving federal crimes committed
by aliens on board foreign aircraft during international flight."
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has been centered around three problems peculiar to crimes
committed during international flight. To exemplify them, constant re-
sort has been made to a particular fact pattern: A non-resident alien com-
mitting a crime against another non-resident alien on board a foreign
aircraft flying from Paris to New York; the offense being perpetrated
over the High Seas; no appropriate extradition treaty existing between the
United States and the flag sovereign.
The first problem raised was that of custody. If the offense only violates
flag penal law, United States landing authorities are powerless to detain
the offender alien. As a solution for the problem, the examination looked
to the Tokyo Convention. It first concluded that that Convention's pro-
visions only had practicable effect when an on-board offense is perpetrated
during an international flight. It then concluded that the Convention's
custodial provisions would not only remedy the problem of arrest but
would substantially assure the immediate prosecution because of their com-
plementation by the Convention's deportation article.
The second problem raised was that of jurisdictional conflict among
several States peculiarly interested in the in-flight crime. To find a solu-
tion, the analysis again had recourse to the Tokyo Convention. It proffered
its own unique interpretation of the Convention's articles on jurisdiction
by first construing Article 3, section 3 to be a treaty waiver of the sov-
ereign power to raise a diplomatic claim against the landing State by all
States except the flag sovereign. Construing Article 15, section 4 and sec-
tion 5 as an investment of primary jurisdiction in the landing State, was
the second basis. It is suggested that the Convention effected an implied
system of priorities, thus ending any diplomatic conflict in the field of
international in-flight crime.
244 It must not be forgotten that the new and special jurisdictional basis is not only predicated
upon landing but also custody. If the Tokyo Convention is ratified, custody becomes a conventional
duty. Thus the Convention and the federal statute on air commerce complement each other to se-
cure the essential elements needed for the special basis.
245 International flight as defined on p. 174 supra.
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The last problem raised was that of prosecution. Where no appropriate
extradition treaty exists between the United States and the flag State and
where the deportation provisions of the Tokyo Convention do not assure
prosecution, the in-flight offender eludes immediate prosecution unless
the United States as landing sovereign has power to prosecute. The precise
issue presenting itself, then, is whether the federal judiciary possesses crimi-
nal jurisdiction to hear and adjudicate a case marked by so many foreign
and extraterritorial factors. To find a solution, recourse was first had to
federal statutes proscribing in-flight crimes; in that district courts have
no jurisdiction over foreign penal offenses, it was necessary to point out
that the in-flight crime had to violate a federal statute. The next step was
that the definition of air commerce-the federal jurisdictional basis over
in-flight crimes-embraced the situation under consideration. Lastly and
most importantly, a recognized jurisdictional basis in international law was
found to which the literal definition of air commerce could be equated.
It is suggested a hitherto unadvanced proposition indicates that custody
upon the contact of landing could be deemed a jurisdictional basis in
international law special only to international in-flight crimes; and as
such was accepted by the statutory definition of air commerce. Through
such an approach, it is concluded that the federal judiciary does indeed
possess jurisdiction to prosecute over the case at hand.
When the examination is viewed as a whole, two things become evident.
In the first instance, there is no situation that can be raised within its
framework where a person who commits a serious felony during interna-
tional flight can escape immediate prosecution after landing in the United
States; and secondly, that both the unratified Tokyo Convention and fed-
eral judicial jurisdiction are the essential factors for such a state of affairs.
It is apparently advisable, therefore, that the Tokyo Convention be rati-
fied by the United States Government.
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